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Amphinomus was at Old Academy, competed with young Aristotle there

24.xi.12; 29.iv.14:    Examples #6 and #7 here illustrate the special grammatical form “kai/toi + participle”, similar to the clause (possibly intruded into Plato’s text by Philip of Opus) at Rep. VI, 511 D 2.

 

 

Philip of Opus is credited with a Euclid-like work “Optics” (noticed by Burnyeat in his recent piece reviving Archytas’s “Optics”).   He may also have been the same man under reference in the puzzling “twn sophwn tis” in Rep. IX,ix, 583B,ff.   Adam’s App. IV makes a mighty effort to identify this  τις  “=tis”, spoken of as one of the “sophoi”, likely with a whiff of irony, sages and pseudo-sages being promiscuously stirred together as they often are within Plato’s writing.    The two leading nominees whom Adam  reviews are Antisthenes and Democritus.   Then there is – paradoxically —  Plato Himself – Philebus 44 B,ff, where the attitudes toward Pleasure are distinctly less preacherly.   But one particular man at the Old Academy who, apart from Plato, wrote at some length about Pleasure, was Philip.   He should be a lively candidate; but he seems overlooked here.   If we trust the SUDA report (you might as well say  [kaitoige] ‘surely you don’t want to give preference to trusting ourselves, critics from 11 centuries later !’).   Philip is credited with a treatise   π. ἡδονῆς   α.  (“p. HEdonEs, 1 book”.)    Our present-day vantagepoint does not allow us to say confidently that no part of that book found its way into what we now call Plato’s Philebus .    Nor can we be sure none of it found its way, alongside material from Eudoxus, into Philip’s student’s book —  EN Books I and X.  

It may be worthwhile to insert an excursus here, based upon a series of Scholia to Euclid I, 15 (esp. Scholl. ##59-62).   This will take us down a path JL Heiberg laid down.   He collected and published with Teubner in 1888, the scholia to all of Euclid’s Elements.      The Scholion of greatest interest here is the one leading toward the Philip-like sentiment also expressed in Schol. #18 (skeptical towards ‘poiEsis’, on the grounds of its debatable concessiveness to ‘time-dependence’ inside mathematics).   We might take steps to follow the distinctive verb ‘diamphisbEtein’ written by Aristotle in his piece ‘On Friendship’, — on some good accounts of Aristotle’s early writing this will have found its way into EN, at Bk IX, 2 1155 a 32ff.   Campbell had called attention to the relative novelty of this term of art as of Plato’s time.    In Aristotle himself, however, it occurs several times, once in the suspect book of the Metaphysics, namely  Kappa.     This is the book that repeats much earlier material from the same treatise, and that is further peculiar in suffering from a rash of DeMundo-style phrasings   ge mh\n  (‘ge mEn’).     Various of these peculiarities were too much for Aristotle scholars beginning with W. Christ and continuing past W.D. Ross.   They agreed that Book Kappa should be deleted in its entirety.    Herbert Granger has recently shown a disinclination to comply  with this scholarly consensus.

There is a good sense of ‘halfway’ which permits us to say that “Halfway back to Plato, — if we began from Aristotle, — we have our filo-qeamw=n(“ PhilotheamOn”) adjacent to Aristotle’s chancing upon the etymology   fil[o]-ippoj  “Phil-ippos” of Plato’s student, Philip of Opus, Aristotle’s teacher in turn [see 1099 a 10 in the ‘E’ MS, commended by myself in a letter to J. Barnes, mine of early Feb 2010].

There is already some allusiveness in Aristotle’s alluding to the name of the man between himself and Plato, Philip of Opus.   But we can find much more in the vicinity of this allusion if we include the point that the word   filoqeamw=n [‘philotheamOn’] is more likely what Aristotle wrote at 1099 a 10.    We need not follow I. Bywater, who not only does not read this word, but also declines to mention its having some ms. authority,  even in his apparatus criticus.    Certainly H.H. Joachim’s high admiration for Bywater and his other early ‘Aristotelian Society’ scholars was well founded [his preface to the 1922 edition of De Gen. et Corr.].    All the same we ought to follow the example of Slings (his Clitophon, p. 342,f) in keeping the door open to there being some ‘ancient tradition’ behind any of various manuscript peculiarities which have survived these dozens of centuries in the textual traditions of Plato and of Aristotle.  In any case the present Oxford edition has the [considerably less plausible] reading filo-qeorw=n  (‘philo-theorwn’).    And, alas, Bywater did not preserve the Bekker note listing the “philo-theamwn” varia lectio.    This imports a quite different meaning, a difference of substance.   It is as if we let a ‘theoretician’ be put in for a theater-goer.      A lover-of-abstract-knowledge  (qeorhmata)  for a lover-of-spectacles qea/mata  (‘theamata’).      ‘Theama’ is in fact the root word meant to be echoed at  Bekker  1099 a10.     So  qeamw=n  has commensurate authority at   a10.

Roughly that same time (say early Olymp. 105, when Philebus  is being composed, and Plato in his very advanced years – those poignantly called ‘our sunset years’ in Laws VI, xiv  — see Slings on Plato’s using the first-personal plural form, in Clitophon , to point to ‘myself’ at 406 a10.    Around this date we have Phil. 44B, referring to ‘some wise someone’ who is further described as  ‘deinos peri physin’.    John Adam made penetrating suggestions on the type of man here alluded to by Plato.   ‘Pythagorean preachers’, says Adam (app. x to Rep. Bk IX.   This would put our author at the Academy and make him not unlike the Empedocles referred to by Aristotle here in EN IX,2.     A threesome of men is put together in Problems 6, 30.    They have attributed to them a shared temperament or ‘personalilty-type’.     Something about their black bile.   This list has oddities of various sorts.  But one striking point is its listing Socrates after Plato:     Empedocles, Plato and Socrates.     The Elder Socrates kept his bile pretty well controlled, we might think:  “Go ahead and condemn me to death, O Athens !    As far as I know this may be a not so severe penalty, especially for a peaceable man, a reflective and perhaps even phlegmatic old man, now aged seventy”.

Can Younger Socrates, or Socrates Alternate have had something more bilious, even choleric, about him ?    He would have to have had considerable personal energy and a willingness to thrust himself forward there at the Academy, claiming  a position in that succession of eminent men beginning back at Socrates Simpliciter, moving forward via Plato and pointing ahead to such prominent men as Eudoxus, Aristotle and Theophrastus.    Again, as we have reliable evidence to inform us, Philip put himself forward as having opinions worth publishing on topics under vigorous debate, such as pleasure, the passion of anger, and On Writing (p. graphein).    Either of the standard meanings of ‘graphein’ here would make Philip a bold man:  “On proving [as in geometry] or On Writing [as in Plato’s Phaedrus”].

 

Returning now to Aristotle’s seemingly polyonymous teacher, call him Amphinomus, call him LeiOdEs, call him Younger Socrates (basileia is among the things Aristotle has under DiamphisbEsis, not so  ?)       In that same DeMundo Chapt 7 spirit of Polyonymising I’d like to add to Philip’s names.    We have it in our best ms. of the Euclid scholion (Heiberg de-prefers this reading, demotes it to his apparatus criticus):   “AristoclEs”.   In Schol. #15, nearby to both #11 and #18 (each of these two latter has peculiarities which may be  signs of Philip’s style) – we have a report about A)risto/lhj kai\ oi( gewme/trai  (‘Aristo/lEs and the geometers’) .   Whoever they were, they came up with their own favorite technical terms for various forms of initial hypotheses or  “anapodeikta”.      Whilst JL Heiberg has printed ‘AristotelEs’ here in Scholion  #15, he is characteristically methodical, and retains in his Critical notes the true reading from our single MS source ( “P”):   ‘Aristo/lhj(sic)    Call him AristoclEs, say I, not far from either SosiclEs (Plautus), or NeoclEs (Problems, XXX, Ch. 6), an otherwise unfamiliar name at Old Academy.

Amphinomus is like the author of the De Mundo, who is emphatic about how Zeus manages his “polyonymy”.   (some of us moderns experience shock at Zeus’s polygamy; others at his polyonymy.  Philip piously admires both.   Amphitryon is as admirable as Amphinomus at this time of Old Academy rivalries and jealousies.   Zeus seems positively to luxuriate in his variety of names as we see him there in DeMundo #7 — even in its sheer variety.   The author, whoever and whenever he was, passes many names of Zeus in review there in the work’s final chapter (Bekker p. 401).    He and Zeus co-luxuriate in the polymorphic variety of all of this.  It is only better if Zeus should have a son younger than Apollo, the cunning and contriving and thieving youngster.   He will steal cattle early on.   Later he will steal names and inspire others to such stealing.   For example the forger of ps-Plato’s Letter #2, if he can be a ‘Socrates re-born’, can steal the name of Socrates and then (having had Plato confess that all of his written work was not truly his own, but rather belongs to Socrates) steal Plato’s entire oeuvre, including the Epinomis and the Minos !

Returning again to the man known to his mother as Philip:   he and others near him at the Old Academy is a lively nominee to be author of the De Mundo.   (My analysis, which draws on work by  D. Schenkeveld, presses hard on the identity of this author.  I end by finding Philip of Opus, the same author revealed behind mask of Plato, at the the ps.-Platonic “Epinomis”.    My conclusion is that Philip was also known as ‘Amphinomus’, particularly where he and Speusippus try to combat a band of mathematicians in the immediate vicinity of Plato and the young Aristotle.   [so reports Proclus, On Eucl Bk One] and therefore, intimately linked (as a ‘doublet’ to Homer’s Leiw/dhj (‘LeiOdEs’) figure. — See B. Fenik, “Studies in the Odyssey”, 1974.

Eudoxus, Speusippus and Aristotle, all joined Philip in writing on the Pleasure Question, the date of all of this Early Academy writing (including notably Philebus) : the 106th Olympiad at the latest.    Rep. IX can easily have been under revision [recall D.H. on Plato’s continually revising his writings until on his death-bed.]    This writing activity – including notably Plato’s own – was likely to be going forward at a rapid pace in Olympiads 104-106, at and after the date of Seventh Letter.

Amphinomus, a somewhat evangelical Friend of Forms’ seems the most plausible candidate for this man behind the mask of tw=n sofw=n tij  (‘twn sophwn tis’).   Our text of 583 B includes a case of ‘kaitoi’, a favorite of Plato’s quasi-friend.    A way of decoding the nickname ‘Amphinomus’ leads via the epithet applied to the suitor Amphinomus in Odyssey XVIII, 152 :     kosmh/twr laou=  (‘kosmEtOr laou’).    It is all the more ironic that it should be Odysseus himself who calls Amphinomus by this mis-placed epithet.   But our Academic ambassador and voyager Plato, at Rep. 422C had raised a storm of ridicule against mythical Agamemnon, “do you say, absurdly, that our great strategist didn’t even know how to count the number of his own feet?”     Plato uses the ‘kaitoi’ phrasing there too, keeping his tone jocular and vernacular.

Our author on Optics, on Pleasure, On Friends and Friendship — the Pythagorean mathematician very close to Plato as he begins his Laws does well here.

Adam is looking for a suitable nominee to be a  “preacher of the Orphic-Pythagorean type”, thus someone at once somewhat admirable and a bit suspect in Plato’s eyes.   But   again,  textual and interpretive difficulties abound near 583B,ff.    They provoke Adam to write explanatory appendices to his text there.  It is clearly a heavy-hearted interpreter Adam who writes this complaint in his Appendix IX to Bk IX, about 585 C,f “the following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato’s writings” (II, p. 354).   Adam struggles, and then reconciles himself to “the least unsatisfactory solution” to his interpretive troubles.  (ibid.)

This may be another case where the world needs to guard our text against the contaminations from outside manipulators — say Amphinomus or his over-zealous ‘friends of the Forms’.   They will be losing their bearings when fighting pitched battles against “Friends of the Earth”.   This bad habit of later Platonists – the habit of ‘tampering’ with texts, say of Aristotle when combatting Plato or others, — or alternatively those of Plato when combatting Aristotle or others.   These tamperers or hybridisers or contaminators — they may not hesitate to tamper [see J. Dillon and J. Whittaker on the well-documented later tamperings with Academic texts, aimed at scoring polemical points.   Ignoring the rules against ‘Straw Man’ arguing.]      It is a distortive simplification to suppose that all intra-Academy polemics, — even when the Academy had yet to complete its first Pentekontaetea, — were variations on the Plato vs. Aristotle wars there.    When Aristotle was writing his (Brunschwig) Topics, (near the 102d or 103d Olympiad) he was not mature enough to write strategy for such little  armies.  Little and little-minded as are most intra-Academic armies.

We may even venture this:   it should be ‘axiomatic’ for any modernday academic [I mean ‘axiom’ in the senses of Scholl. 11 and 15 to Euclid I, as edited by J.L. Heiberg]  that Academic wars can break out in many directions.  They will be wildly various, as alliances form and sub-sectarian quarrels devolve from earlier and different battles of the larger sectarian units or tribes.   Scholl. 11 and 15 bring out the etymology of ‘axiom’:   “something which  I or one of my colleagues currently think valuable,   ἀξιούμεν  (‘axioumen’)”].       In a letter a couple years ago I asked a colleague formerly from Balliol College – a widely respected Aristotle scholar, in fact —  whether he had come up against such a local and party-quarrel context at or near Balliol, for such an august term as Aristotle’s word.    Ἀξιώμα (Axioma).   From his silence I infer that such a party-quarrel was something he had never witnessed at Balliol, nor heard tell of on his island, — say at Kings College Cambridge.

F.M. Cornford’s little tract, written down in a compressed 2-week period, gives a further perspective on academic in-fighting.  He entitled it “Microcosmographia Academica”, echoing a title from the 17th century.   Some decades later it came out in a second edition, where there will have been more intensity of historical scholarly research at work.   The tract includes a large-scale photograph of a large collection of early 20th century “friends of the University[ sc. Cambridge]”.   Stage-left in the photograph is a diminutive but head-held-high man, “the Orator”, and stage-center is the fully vested figure, that of the national and imperial Monarch himself.   A curious and comedic variant on Plato’s ideal of political power intimately linked with Rhetorical Art.    Dr. Henry Jackson was perhaps not on that photographer’s exact scene, but he will have had a pretty full comprehension of various of its details.  Also, of its iconic value representing Plato’s phrase for party conflicts within philosophy,  a scene of battles carried out   ἀνδρειῶς καὶ ἐριστικῶς  Rep V. 454 b5.   This is where Holger Thesleff found Plato’s prose betraying an “onkos” style, the style of his latest dialogues, when Philip and his entourage were busy executing their intra-Academy “epistasis”, or “uprising”.    Dr. Jackson got personally involved to such a depth in the intra-Cambridge issue over co-education there that he had to be (personally) carried into the Senate chambers to cast his vote (pro-women) there in 1921.

Here is a curious sidelight on the history of this Universal, academic eristic.  It goes back to fall of 1902 and spring of 1903 in Cambridge, England.  Late in 1902 lectures were given by Dr. Henry Jackson in Cambridge on Aristotle’s Metaphisics.  Notes were taken down by then-young-scholar Leonard Hugh Graham (LHG) Greenwood.   He took them from Dr. Jackson’s lectures on Aristotles Metaphysics.  They have Jackson referring to Aristotle’s phrase   κατὰ ξυμβέβεκος  in a peculiarly dismissive way.  Jackson called the phrase “slang”. [these Greenwood notes are unpublished, but are contained in Greenwood’s minute letters, lovely multi-colored ink, in an interleaved copy of his OCT text, later owned by Hamish Wilson.   I last saw this volume in summer of 1984, and relayed it to officers at Kings College Cambridge library in the fall of that year 1984, via G.E.R. Lloyd].    Jackson is there reported to have “dismissed the entire series of chapters, with abuse”.    Alas, these include the chapter Z, 11 where Aristotle mentions a “Younger Socrates”.   Some of this material, net of its colorful inking, can soon be published here on this website.

Whatever the accidentalities of the thing our transatlantic colleagues pronounce as contr-O-versy, and we Americans vocalise as CON-troversy, — Academic quarrels seem an essential part of  our great Herebelow.  They are universal enough to counter the Vienna line-against-all-metaphysics parroted by K.J. Dover, his 1980 edition of Symposium, p. 6.  Consider this from Dover direct:

“[Plato believed that] something more, something that ‘really exists’, unchanging, indepedent of our indefinitely adjustable and pragmatic definitions.   Whether this belief happens to be right, happens to be wrong, or is insufficiently meaningful to be called either [emphasis my own]. . .”   

As surely as the apostle Paul brought us doctrines later promulgated more systematically from St. Peter’s in Rome, so surely does the acolyte Dover here echo doctrines centered in the Vienna of the 1920s and 1930s.   The apostle in the latter case went by the name A.J. Ayer.   The acolyte and the apostle help us overturn the dogmatisms flowing down out of their circle’s center, Vienna.

To resume the story of our men very near to Plato in time and place.  Some of their later followers seem to have felt free to “tamper” (so Dillon, following Whittaker) with texts in what we may call, following Campbell “victorious analysis”.

A lead example here is one Philip had a special interest in.   It is a close parallel to — perhaps nearly identical to — what is at stake back at Schol. #18 to Book I of ‘Elements’.   The Scholiast wants to edify the reader by raising up the level of his gaze.   We must discipline ourselves to make sure we are gazing only upon the pure and purely mathematical.   But this requires us to abstain from (in a manner of speaking) soil our hands with production-or-making.    The famous ‘Divided Line’ calls on us to section off (a recently trendy formula for this is ‘draw a bright line’) — between those ‘lower’ applications of the human mind, where ‘gross matter’ is managed, manoeuvered, manipulated and so forth.   What it is customary to entitle or label (epiklEsis is the word in Epinomis 973b) ‘PoiEsis’.

The very label Q.E.F., or in the ancient form   ὅπερ ἔδει ποιῆσαι , says Philip or the Philip-like commentator there, invites us to depreciate the thing ‘made’ or ‘produced’.   The phrase “hoper edei poiEsai” implies our platonist demotion of its status as ‘mere product’.    Essences are a whole world different.   They are “there”, not “here” to paraphrase a retort to the young Aristotle’s challenge.   An object of ‘Thewrein’ is just there for us to gaze upon.    It makes no sense to say of The Triangle-as-Itself that it was ever “made”.    Here we are encountering a variant of the same issue that created a schism within the Academy, that which had the “eternal cosmos” only in a figurative or ‘pedagocical’ sense a thing “made” or “constructed”.   Thus in the case of Prop. 1 of Euclid, the ‘once triangle’ is only said of a figure ‘just now’ constructed in a metaphorical manner.  We need to keep bringing out for ourselves and reminding ourselves of this fundamental falling short of being and ideality which “poiesis” is a threat to.   Thus we must continue to divide in a bright-line way between then-triangle(s) and the kind Scholion #112 formulates the essential triangle :    τὸ τρίγωνον ᾕ ἑαύτῇ (to\ tri/gwnon h(=| e(auth=|)  , in other words the one resident amongst the Ever-Similar range of things.    To be sure, the classical locus of this complaint from Philip is in Proclus.    It may be natural to suppose that Heiberg’s Schol. #112 to Euclid Book I derives from Proclus.   This would mean it had only a slim chance of being traceable to something written while Plato was still alive, or even anything as early as (say) Plutarch or Chrysippus.     An argument is wanting, in the spirit of “let us philologues be as keen to avoid the rash extreme of uncritical skepticism as we standardly are in avoiding incaution” – the spirit, let us call this, of Walter Burkert.      A philologue’s behavior can rhyme with “Vorsicht”, to be sure.   But rational Vorsicht may call on him to restrain his over-restraint, and test out impartially the likelihood (however slim) that, as Slings has put it recently “something ancient”  may lie behind the peculiarities we now and then in texts we have before us today.

We may express this in at least two ways, where the parallelism will be manifest.  (1) The Triangle ‘hE heautE’ has never known a time when it Was Not, or when it (so to speak) ‘stood in need of being constructed’ and (2) that is by nature a thing of which we may not legitimately ask the question e)/c ou(=( ‘ex hou’ )  question – unless we are prepared to accept a somewhat paradoxical form of answer.   ‘Mathematical’ or ‘geometrical’ matter is an answer with the air of paradox about it;  the puzzling phrase ‘noEtic matter’, coming down to us from the Old Academy when Aristotle and Younger Socrates were there debating mathematical platonism in the way rival ‘diadochoi’ or ‘heirs’ might debate (even quarrel) over rival heritages they were prepared to draw from Plato himself.    There will be another view of this same subject – drawn from a man we may identify with the anonymous ‘someone’ of Proclus’s Friedlein p.

You may ask:   “but where do you find a text carrying that phrase of yours ‘geometrical matter’?”     There is an answer, thanks to careful scholarly work such as that by G. Friedlein (Teubner), his edition of Proclus “In primum Euclidis…”, esp. p. 49, line 5,  and p. 50 lines 7,f.     We’ll be equivocating (cf. speaking perabusively, in the manner of the ‘diakatachrEstikoteros’ of Schol. 30 to Eucl. Bk V, if we act like we have just a single ‘middle’ between pure NoEsis and that extremely movable/variable contact with the multiple “ekgonoi’ [cf. pg. 53,26] amongst material things.   [was it not likely to be Philip who wrote that suite of Scholia, — perhaps in various works done to various ends originally —  drawing out a metaphor of ‘mothers’, ‘ancestors’, ‘offspring’.   I mean Schol. to Chapt IV of Bk X.   Likely so, I  now judge – 04.iv.12]

Geometrical matter is an ‘out of which’ for (a) triangle, (b) circle or (c) [definition of] SchEma ‘out of [dia]noEtic matter’, and (you might as well say) ‘out of geometric matter’ or ‘out of noEtic matter’.     Now  is a wholly unintrusive ‘looking upon’ that the mathematician, at his full dianoEtic  “PoiEton” is replaced by Philip with  “noEton” at Tim. 92 C, as fits well with a ‘pythagorean knowledgeable about Nature’.    It takes a proud and self-assured “preacher” to tamper thus with any text in the Eighth Tetralogy.   The deeply inventive mind of Philip (Younger Socrates) was such a preacher, I believe, and did much of his work near Olympiad 105-106.

24.xi.12:    Examples #6 and #7 of this TLG search report on the Scholia to Euclid.   These are lead examples of the combination particle “kaitoi”.    This is in turn followed immediately by a participle (in the genitive case).    A similar clause seems to have been intruded into Plato’s text, perhaps by Philip of Opus,  at Rep. VI, 511 D 2.

At the Old Academy, Philip’s nickname appears to have been “Amphinomus”.  possibly he had a second speaker-name, h.e.  “Younger Socrates”.   This possibility should be followed down by someone, perhaps myself, when a blogsite like youngersocrates.net exists and is hospitable to this.   Each was well acquainted with mathematics, each was personally known to the elderly Plato and the juvenile Aristotle.   Anyone from that same Early Academy will have associated Amphinomus with LeiOdEs, in the tradition of Homer being the ‘doublet’ character to Amphinomus.   [so B. Fenik ‘Studies in the Odyssey’ (Mnemosyne 1974), esp. pp. 192-196.].

Philip is credited with a Euclid-like work “Optics” (noticed by Burnyeat in his recent piece reviving Archytas’s “Optics”).   He may also have been the same man under reference in the puzzling “twn sophwn tis” in Rep. IX,ix, 583B,ff.   Adam’s App. IV makes a mighty effort to identify this “tij”, spoken of as one of the “sophoi”, perhaps with a hint of irony.    The two leading nominees whom he reviews are Antisthenes and Democritus.   Then there is – paradoxically —  Plato Himself – Philebus 44 B,ff, where the attitudes toward pleasure are distinctly less preacherly.

But one particular man at the Old Academy who, apart from Plato, wrote at some length about Pleasure seems overlooked here.   If we trust the SUDA report (you might as well say  [kaitoige] ‘surely you don’t want to trust ourselves, critics from 11 centuries later !’).   Philip is credited with a treatise  p. h(donh=j a.  (“p. HEdonEs, 1 book”.)    Our present-day vantagepoint does not allow us to say confidently that no part of that book found its way into what we now call Plato’s Philebus.    Nor can we be sure none of it found its way, alongside material from Eudoxus, into EN Books X and IX. 

It may be worthwhile to insert an excursus here, Scholia to Euclid I, 15 (esp. Scholl. ##59-62).   This will take us down a path JL Heiberg laid down.   He collected and published with Teubner in 1888, the scholia to all of Euclid’s Elements.   the one leading toward the Philip-like sentiment expressed in Schol. #18 (skeptical towards ‘poiEsis’, as making concessions to ‘time-dependence’ inside mathematics).   We might take steps to follow the distinctive verb ‘diamphisbEtein’ written by Aristotle in his piece ‘On Friendship’, — on some good accounts of Aristotle’s early writing this will have found its way into EN, at Bk IX, 2 1155 a 32ff.   As far back in time as Plato this rather specialised verb was a striking one, on account of its rarity.   In Aristotle himself, however, it occurs several times, once in the suspect Met. Kappa.   This is the book that repeats much earlier material from the same treatise, and that is further peculiar in suffering from a rash of DeMundo-style phrasings   ge mh\n  (‘ge mEn’).     Various of these peculiarities were too much for Aristotle scholars beginning with W. Christ and continuing past W.D. Ross.   They agreed that Book Kappa should be deleted in its entirety.    Herbert Granger has recently shown a disinclination to comply  with this scholarly consensus.

There is a good sense of ‘halfway’ which permits us to say that “Halfway back to Plato, — if we began from Aristotle, — we have our filo-qeamw=n(“ PhilotheamOn”) adjacent to Aristotle’s chancing upon the etymology   fil[o]-ippoj  “Phil-ippos” of Plato’s student, Philip of Opus, Aristotle’s teacher in turn [see 1099 a 10 in the ‘E’ MS, commended by myself in a letter to J. Barnes, mine of early Feb 2010].

There is already some allusiveness in Aristotle’s alluding to the name of the man between himself and Plato, Philip of Opus.   But there is more to the allusion if we include the point that the word   filoqeamw=n [‘philotheamOn’] is more likely what Aristotle wrote at 1099 a 10.    We need not follow I. Bywater, who not only does not read this word, but also declines to mention its having some ms. authority,  even in his apparatus criticus.    In any case the present Oxford edition has the [somewhat less plausible] reading filo-qewrw=n  (‘philo-theorwn’).    But this imports a quite different meaning, a difference of substance.   It is as if we let a ‘theoretician’ be put in for a theater-goer.      A lover-of-abstract-knowledge  (qeorhmata)  for a lover-of-spectacles qea/mata  (‘theamata’).      ‘Theama’ is in fact the root word meant to be echoed at  Bekker  1099 a10.     So  qeamw=n  has commensurate authority at   a10.

Roughly that same time (say early Olymp. 106, when Philebus  is being composed, and Plato in his very advanced years – those poignantly called ‘our sunset years’ in Laws VI, xiv  — see Slings on Plato’s using the first-personal plural form, in Clitophon for example, to indicate ‘myself’ at 406 a10.    Around this date we have Phil. 44B, referring to ‘some wise someone’ who is further described as  ‘deinos peri physin’.    John Adam made penetrating suggestions on the type of man here alluded to by Plato.   ‘Pythagorean preachers’, says Adam (app. x to Rep. Bk IX.   This would put our author at the Academy and make him not unlike the Empedocles referred to by Aristotle here in EN IX,2.     A threesome of men is put together in Problems xxx, 6.    They have attributed to them a shared temperament or ‘personalilty-type’.     Something about their black bile.   This list has oddities apart from mentioning Socrates after Plato:     Empedocles, Plato and Socrates.     The Elder Socrates kept his bile pretty well controlled, we might think.    Can Younger Socrates have had something more bilious about him ?

Returning now to Aristotle’s seemingly polyonymous teacher, call him Amphinomus, call him LeiOdEs, call him Younger Socrates (basileia is among the things Aristotle has under DiamphisbEsis, not so  ?)       In that same DeMundo Chapt 7 spirit of Polyonymising I’d like to add to Philip’s names.    We have it in our best ms. of the Euclid scholion (Heiberg de-prefers this reading, demotes it to his apparatus criticus):   “AristoclEs”.   In Schol. #15, nearby to both #11 and #18 (each of these two latter has peculiarities which may be  signs of Philip’s style) – we have a report about A)risto/lhj kai\ oi( gewme/trai  (‘Aristo/lEs and the geometers’) .   Whoever they were, they came up with their own favorite technical terms for various forms of initial hypotheses or  “anapodeikta”.      Whilst JL Heiberg has printed ‘AristotelEs’ here in Scholion  #15, he is characteristically methodical, and retains in his Critical notes the true reading from our single MS source ( “P”):   ‘Aristo/lhj(sic)    Call him AristoclEs, say I, not far from either SosiclEs (Plautus), or NeoclEs (Problems, XXX, Ch. 6), an otherwise unfamiliar name at Old Academy.

Amphinomus is like the author of the De Mundo, who is emphatic about how Zeus manages his “polyonymy”.   (some of us moderns experience shock at Zeus’s polygamy; others at his polyonymy.  Philip piously admires both.   Amphitryon is as admirable as Amphinomus at this time of Old Academy rivalries and jealousies.   Zeus seems positively to luxuriate in his variety of names as we see him there in DeMundo #7 — even in its sheer variety.   The author, whoever and whenever he was, passes many names of Zeus in review there in the work’s final chapter (Bekker p. 401).    He and Zeus co-luxuriate in the polymorphic variety of all of this.  It is only better if Zeus should have a son younger than Apollo, the cunning and contriving and thieving youngster.   He will steal cattle early on.   Later he will steal names and inspire others to such stealing.   For example the forger of ps-Plato’s Letter #2, if he can be a ‘Socrates re-born’, can steal the name of Socrates and then (having had Plato confess that all of his written work was not truly his own, but rather belongs to Socrates) steal Plato’s entire oeuvre, including the Epinomis and the Minos !

Returning again to the man known to his mother as Philip:   he and others near him at the Old Academy is a lively nominee to be author of the De Mundo.   (My analysis, which draws on work by  D. Schenkeveld, presses hard on the identity of this author.  I end by finding Philip of Opus, the same author revealed behind mask of Plato, at the the ps.-Platonic “Epinomis”.    My conclusion is that Philip was also known as ‘Amphinomus’, particularly where he and Speusippus try to combat a band of mathematicians in the immediate vicinity of Plato and the young Aristotle.   [so reports Proclus, On Eucl Bk One] and therefore, intimately linked (as a ‘doublet’ to Homer’s Leiw/dhj (‘LeiOdEs’) figure. — See B. Fenik, “Studies in the Odyssey”, 1974.

Eudoxus, Speusippus and Aristotle, all joined Philip in writing on the Pleasure Question, the date of all of this Early Academy writing (including notably Philebus) : the 106th Olympiad at the latest.    Rep. IX can easily have been under revision [recall D.H. on Plato’s continually revising his writings until on his death-bed.]    This writing activity – including notably Plato’s own – was likely to be going forward at a rapid pace in Olympiads 104-106, at and after the date of Seventh Letter.

Amphinomus, a somewhat evangelical Friend of Forms’ seems the most plausible candidate for this man behind the mask of tw=n sofw=n tij  (‘twn sophwn tis’).   Our text of 583 B includes a case of ‘kaitoi’, a favorite of Plato’s quasi-friend.    A way of decoding the nickname ‘Amphinomus’ leads via the epithet applied to the suitor Amphinomus in Odyssey XVIII, 152 :     kosmh/twr laou=  (‘kosmEtOr laou’).    It is all the more ironic that it should be Odysseus himself who calls Amphinomus by this mis-placed epithet.   But our Academic ambassador and voyager Plato, at Rep. 422C had raised a storm of ridicule against mythical Agamemnon, “do you say, absurdly, that our great strategist didn’t even know how to count the number of his own feet?”     Plato uses the ‘kaitoi’ phrasing there too, keeping his tone jocular and vernacular.

Our author on Optics, on Pleasure, On Friends and Friendship — the Pythagorean mathematician [Philip] very close to Plato as he begins his Laws does well as a candidate here.

Adam is looking for a suitable nominee to be a  “preacher of the Orphic-Pythagorean type”, thus someone at once somewhat admirable and a bit suspect in Plato’s eyes.   But   again,  textual and interpretive difficulties abound near 583B,ff.    They provoke Adam to write explanatory appendices to his text there.  It is clearly a heavy-hearted interpreter Adam who writes this complaint in his Appendix IX to Bk IX, about 585 C,f “the following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato’s writings” (II, p. 354).   Adam struggles, and then reconciles himself to “the least unsatisfactory solution” to his interpretive troubles.  (ibid.)

This may be another case where the world needs to guard our text against the contaminations from outside manipulators — say Amphinomus or his over-zealous ‘friends of the Forms’.   They will be losing their bearings when fighting pitched battles against “Friends of the Earth”.   This bad habit of later Platonists – the habit of ‘tampering’ with texts, say of Aristotle when combatting Plato or others, say of Plato when combatting Aristotle or others — they may not hesitate to tamper [see J. Dillon and J. Whittaker on the well-documented later tamperings with Academic texts, aimed at scoring polemical points.]      It is a distortive simplification to suppose that all intra-Academy polemics, — even when the Academy had yet to complete its first Pentekontaetea, — were variations on the Plato vs. Aristotle wars there.

We may even say further this:   it should be ‘axiomatic’ [in the senses of Scholl. 11 and 15 to Euclid I] for any modernday academic that Academic wars can break out in many directions, earlier and later, varying wildly as alliances form and sub-sectarian quarrels devolve from earlier and different battles.   Scholl. 11 and 15 bring out the etymology of ‘axiom’:   “something of which  I or one of my colleagues have recently held  a)ciou/men (‘axioumen’)”].       In a letter a couple years ago I asked a colleague formerly from Balliol College – an Aristotle scholar, in fact —  whether he had come up against such a local and party-quarrel context for such an august term as Aristotle’s word  A)ciw/ma .   From his silence I infer that such a party-quarrel was something he had never witnessed at Balliol, nor heard tell of at Kings College Cambridge either.

These men seem to have felt free to “tamper” (so Dillon, following Whittaker).

A lead example of a motivation is one Philip had a special interest in.   It is a close parallel to what is at stake back at Schol. #18 to Book I of ‘Elements’ our intentions are only pure and purely mathematical if we don’t (in a manner of speaking) soil our hands with production-or-making.    The famous ‘Divided Line’ calls on us to section off those ‘lower’ applications of the human mind, where ‘gross matter’ is managed, manoeuvered, manipulated and so forth.   What it is customary to entitle or label (epiklEsis is the word in Epinomis 973b) ‘PoiEsis’.

The very word, says Philip there guides us to deprecate the thing ‘made’ or ‘produced’.   The phrase “hoper edei poiEsai” implies our platonist demotion of its status as ‘mere product’.    Essences are not like that.   An object of ‘Thewrein’ is just there for us to gaze upon, by contrast.    It makes no sense to say of The Triangle-as-Itself (hE heautE).

the ‘once triangle’ is only said of a figure ‘just now’ constructed – in order to bring out this fundamental falling short of being and ideality, and to divide between then-triangle(s) and the kind Scholion #112 formulates the essential triangle : to\ tri/gwnon h(=| e(auth=|  , in other words the one resident amongst the Ever-Similar range of things.    To be sure, the classical locus of this complaint from Philip is in Proclus.    It may be natural to suppose that Heiberg’s Schol. #112 to Euclid Book I derives from Proclus.   This would mean it had only a slim chance of being traceable to something written while Plato was still alive, or even anything as early as (say) Plutarch or Chrysippus.     An argument is wanting, in the spirit of “let us philologues be as keen to avoid the rash extreme of uncritical skepticism as we standardly are in avoiding incaution” – the spirit, let us call this, of Walter Burkert.      A philologue’s behavior can rhyme with “Vorsicht”, to be sure.   But rational Vorsicht may call on him to restrain his over-restraint, and test out impartially the likelihood (however slim) that, as Slings has put it recently “something ancient”  may lie behind the peculiarities we now and then in texts we have before us today.

We may express this in at least two ways, where the parallelism will be manifest.  (1) The Triangle ‘hE heautE’ has never known a time when it Was Not, or when it (so to speak) ‘stood in need of being constructed’ and (2) that is by nature a thing of which we may not legitimately ask the question e)/c ou(=( ‘ex hou’ )  question – unless we are prepared to accept a somewhat paradoxical form of answer.   ‘Mathematical’ or ‘geometrical’ matter is an answer with the air of paradox about it;  the puzzling phrase ‘noEtic matter’, coming down to us from the Old Academy when Aristotle and Younger Socrates were there debating mathematical platonism in the way rival ‘diadochoi’ or ‘heirs’ might debate (even quarrel) over rival heritages they were prepared to draw from Plato himself.    There will be another view of this same subject – drawn from a man we may identify with the anonymous ‘someone’ of Proclus’s Friedlein p.

You may ask:   “but where do you find a text carrying that phrase of yours ‘geometrical matter’?”     There is an answer, thanks to careful scholarly work such as that by G. Friedlein (Teubner), his edition of Proclus “In primum Euclidis…”, esp. p. 49, line 5,  and p. 50 lines 7,f.     We’ll be equivocating (cf. speaking perabusively, in the manner of the ‘diakatachrEstikoteros’ of Schol. 30 to Eucl. Bk V, if we act like we have just a single ‘middle’ between pure NoEsis and that extremely movable/variable contact with the multiple “ekgonoi’ [cf. pg. 53,26] amongst material things.   [was it not likely to be Philip who wrote that suite of Scholia, — perhaps in various works done to various ends originally —  drawing out a metaphor of ‘mothers’, ‘ancestors’, ‘offspring’.   I mean Schol. to Chapt IV of Bk X.   Likely so, I  now judge – 04.iv.12]

Geometrical matter is an ‘out of which’ for (a) triangle, (b) circle or (c) [definition of] SchEma ‘out of [dia]noEtic matter’, and (you might as well say) ‘out of geometric matter’ or ‘out of noEtic matter’.     Now  is a wholly unintrusive ‘looking upon’ that the mathematician, at his full dianoEtic  “PoiEton” is replaced by Philip with  “noEton” at Tim. 92 C, as fits well with a ‘pythagorean knowledgeable about Nature’.    It takes a proud and self-assured “preacher” to tamper thus with any text in the Eighth Tetralogy.   The deeply inventive mind of Philip (Younger Socrates) was such a preacher, I believe, and did much of his work near Olympiad 105-106.

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